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Abstract This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous
and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there
are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower
bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimally manipulable
social choice functions. Since some of these examples are even Pareto optimal, we have also
derived the lower bound for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some
of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be
interpreted as status quo voting.
1 Introduction
A well-known result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that any strategy-proof
surjective social choice function on more than two alternatives is dictatorial. This implies that
anonymity and unanimity are not compatible with strategy-proofness. Here we investigate
how incompatible these are, i.e. how much manipulability we have to allow at anonymous and
unanimous social choice functions.
There are a few studies on the degree of vulnerability for strategic behaviour of classical
social choice functions, such as Borda, Plurality, etc.. For example, Aleskerov (1999) contains
simulation and enumeration results on 26 different social choice functions for different indices
of manipulability. Slinko (2002) counts the number of instabile profiles of classical social choice
functions, which is an upper bound for the number of manipulable profiles of these social
choice functions. On the other hand, little is known about to what extent manipulability has
to be admitted by social choice functions satisfying certain properties. Results on this may
provide lower bounds to which then all social choice functions satisfying these properties can
be compared. A first investigation was pioneered by Kelly (1988), who found the minimal
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number of manipulable profiles for nondictatorial surjective social choice functions with three
alternatives and two agents and also formulated several conjectures. This line of research was
continued by Fristrup and Keiding (1998), who determined the minimal number of manipulable
profiles for two agents and any number of alternatives. Maus et al. (2004b) consider the three
alternative case and show that for any number of agents larger than two there are six minimally
manipulable nondictatorial surjective social choice functions, and these are even anonymous.
However, they also consider minimally manipulable unanimous and nondictatorial social choice
functions. These turn out to be nondictatorial only in a minimal sense, namely at only one
profile.
Here we will exclude such social choice functions by demanding that agents are treated
anonymously and choice is unanimous. Maus et al. (2004a) contain results for this case if
unanimity is replaced with surjectivity. In particular, anonymous social choice functions are
nondictatorial. So, we are interested in the minimal number of manipulable profiles that an
anonymous unanimous social choice function has to admit. It is well known that in case of
two alternatives any monotonic social choice function is strategy-proof. As monotonicity and
anonymity are compatible (see e.g. May (1952)) in case of two alternatives this minimal number
is zero. We consider the three alternatives case and show that the minimal number is 2n − 2.
Furthermore, we give examples of social choice functions reaching that lower bound and point
out that some of these examples are even Pareto optimal. So, 2n − 2 is also the lower bound
for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. After that we argue that status
quo voting is an example of a Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice function that is
minimally manipulable for three alternatives.
It should be noted that the way in which we measure manipulability, namely by counting
manipulable profiles, is not the only possible one. In fact there are a lot of variations of this,
where for example profiles are counted by the number of agents that can manipulate them, or
the severity of the manipulation is taken into account. The severity is measured by the distance
in the agent’s ranking between what he achieves with and without manipulation. Aleskerov
(1999) contains an overview of such variations and numerical results on the manipulability of
26 social choice functions according to these measurements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic definitions. Then, Section
3 shows some special results about the manipulability of two and three agent social choice
functions that will be used in our proof of the main result. The main result, saying that any
unanimous and anonymous social choice function over three alternatives has at least 2n − 2
manipulable profiles, where n is the number of agents, is proven in Section 4. After that we
provide examples of social choice functions attaining that lower bound in Section 5. In Section
6 we see that some of the examples from Section 5 are even Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality
is a stronger requirement than unanimity. This shows, given anonymity, that though Pareto
optimality is stronger it does not raise the number of manipulable profiles one has to admit
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compared to imposing unanimity. Finally, we show that the minimally manipulable Pareto
optimal and anonymous social choice functions have a nice interpretation as status quo voting
rules.
2 Preliminaries
We denote the cardinality of a set S by |S|. Let N be the set of natural numbers, and let
N0 := N ∪ {0}. Let ⌈⌉ denote the upper entier. So for n ∈ N0
⌈
n
2
⌉
:= min{l ∈ N0 | l ≥
n
2
}.
Let A be a finite set of alternatives, m := |A| ≥ 3, and N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of
agents, n ≥ 2.
Let t ⊂ A × A. We call t complete if for all x, y ∈ A (x, y) ∈ t or (y, x) ∈ t. Note that
completeness of t implies (x, x) ∈ t for all x ∈ A. We call t transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ A
(x, y) ∈ t and (y, z) ∈ t implies (x, z) ∈ A. We call t antisymmetric if for all x, y ∈ A (x, y) ∈ t
and (y, x) ∈ t implies that x = y.
A preference t ⊂ A × A is a linear order (complete, transitive, antisymmetric) on A.
Let P denote the set of all preferences. Suppose that A = {x1, x2, . . . xm}. By completeness,
transitivity and antisymmetry we can write conveniently
t = x1x2 . . . xm
for the preference t such that (xi, xj) ∈ t if and only if i ≥ j, i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m},
t = . . . x . . . y . . .
if we want to express only that x is strictly preferred to y, and
t = x . . .
if we want to express only that x is preferred to all other alternatives.
A profile is a map p : N → P . Thus, a profile assigns to every agent i a preference p(i) over
the alternatives. For a nonempty subset S of N we denote by p|S the restriction of the map p
to the domain S. The set of all profiles is denoted by PN .
For a permutation σ of N and a profile p ∈ PN let p ◦σ be the profile given by (p ◦ σ)(i) :=
p(σ(i)) for all i ∈ N . Two profiles p, q ∈ PN are called anonymously equivalent if there is a
permutation σ of N such that q = p ◦ σ. Then |p−1(t)| = |q−1(t)| for all t ∈ P . We denote
anonymous equivalence between p and q in PN by p ∼ q and write [p] := {q ∈ PN | q ∼ p}.
For all p ∈ PN ,
|[p]| :=
n!∏
t∈P |p
−1(t)|!
.
A social choice function is a function f : PN → A. Hence, a social choice function selects a
unique alternative f(p) at every profile p.
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A social choice function is called surjective if any alternative in A is chosen at least once,
i.e. if f(PN) = A. In literature this is also known as citizen-sovereignty. Moreover, a social
choice function is called unanimous if f(p) = x for all profiles p ∈ PN such that p(i) = x . . . for
all i ∈ N. Clearly, unanimity is stronger than surjectivity. Throughout this paper we assume
that any social choice function is at least surjective.
A social choice function is called anonymous if f([p]) = {f(p)} for all p ∈ PN . Thus,
anonymous social choice functions are symmetric in the arguments. In a sense they treat
agents equally.
In contrast to anonymity, the following social choice functions respect only the preference
of a single agent. Let d ∈ N and for any profile p let
dictd(p) := x
where x is such that (x, y) ∈ p(d) for all y ∈ A. So x is the most preferred alternative of agent d
in p. The social choice functions f = dictd, d ∈ N , are called dictatorial social choice functions,
and agent d is called a dictator. A social choice function f is called nondictatorial if there is
no agent d such that f = dictd.
We are interested in strategic behaviour of individuals when facing cooperative decision-
making as captured by social choice functions. This is formalized by the following definitions.
Let f : PN → A be a social choice function. Let p ∈ PN be a profile. Then each profile q such
that, for some i ∈ N, q|N−{i} = p|N−{i} and q(i) 6= p(i), is called an i-devation from p. Letting
t := q(i) we use the notation q = (p−i, t). If it is not important which agent deviates from p
to q we call q a deviation from p. A profile p is called manipulable (under f) if there is an
agent that is better off by being dishonest about his preference, i.e. if there is an i ∈ N, and
an i-deviation q such that
(f(p), f(q)) /∈ p(i).
In this case we say that p is manipulable towards q (under f). Let
Mf := {p ∈ p
N | p is manipulable under f}.
Note that p ∈ Mf implies that [p] ⊆ Mf . A social choice function is called strategy-proof if
Mf = ∅, otherwise it is said to be manipulable. Let F be a nonempty set of social choice
functions. We call f ∗ minimally manipulable if f ∗ ∈ argminf∈F |Mf |.
The prominence of the dictatorial rules arises from the following impossibility result due to
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975).
Theorem 1 Let A be a finite set of alternatives, |A| ≥ 3. Let f : PN → A be a nondictatorial
surjective social choice function. Then
|Mf | ≥ 1.
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However, this theorem makes no statement about the number of manipulable profiles such
social choice functions admit. This question has been solved by Kelly (1988) for two agents
and three alternatives, and by Fristrup and Keiding (1998) for two agents, and any number
of alternatives larger than three. Maus et al. (2004b) consider the case of unanimous and
nondictatorial social choice function for any numbers of agents and alternatives larger than or
equal to three, and the case of surjective and nondictatorial social choice functions for three
alternatives. Maus et al. (2004a) consider the case of anonymous and surjective social choice
functions, but have to leave some cases open.
Here we address the case of unanimous and anonymous social choice functions over three
alternatives. So, let F be the set of all such social choice functions with a set of agents N such
that |N | = n ≥ 2. We will need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2 Let k, l ∈ N. Then
k!l! ≤ (k + l − 1)!
Proof.
(k+l−1)!
k!l!
= 1
k+l
(
k+l
k
)
≥ 1 as k + l > k > 0.
3 Special results for two and three agents
Since the connection of the results of this section with the main result is far from obvious we
sketch the proof of the main result beforehand.
Let f ∈ F. We will prove that there are natural numbers k1, k2 such that
n
2
≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ n,
and profiles qki ∈ Mf for all
n
2
≤ k ≤ ki − 1, k ∈ N, i ∈ {1, 2} with the following properties.
Each such qki shows that there are at least
(
n
k
)
manipulable profiles in Mf , which can be equal
to the ones from another qki only if k =
n
2
for both profiles. Furthermore, we show that
if ki < n, i ∈ {1, 2}, then there is a pi ∈ Mf that yields at least another
n−1∑
j=ki
(
n
j
)
different
manipulable profiles in Mf . Altogether we will have that in any case
|Mf | ≥
n−1∑
j=1
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 2,
which is our main result. We find the qki by applying Theorem 3 to two agent social choice
functions fk,
n
2
≤ k < k2, defined from f . To show that the manipulable profiles arising from
the same fk, k 6=
n
2
, are different we need the statements of Lemma 4. To apply Theorem 3
and Lemma 4 we need that the fk, k < k2, are nondictatorial. This will be shown by applying
Lemma 5 to three person social choice function g defined from f . This will also show that the
pi exist if ki < n.
Now, we present the mentioned results for two and three agent social choice functions.
Throughout the rest of this section let N = {1, 2} if there are two agents, and N = {1, 2, 3} if
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there are three agents. Two agent social choice functions can be depicted in 6x6 tables, since
we have only six preferences. We let agent 1′s preference be constant in rows and agent 2′s
preference constant in columns. The following result is taken from Kelly (1988). It can also be
proven by considering 6x6 tables.
Theorem 3 Let f : PN → A be a surjective two agent social choice function. Then f is either
dictatorial or |Mf | ≥ 2.
Let Df :Mf → 2
N×P be the correspondence assigning to each manipulable profile the set of
agents that can manipulate and the preferences they can use to manipulate, i.e. for all p ∈Mf ,
Df(p) := {(i, t) ∈ N × P | (f(p), f(p−i, t)) /∈ p(i)}.
The first result shows some properties of Df for unanimous and nondictatorial two agent social
choice function.
Lemma 4 Let f : PN → A be a unanimous and nondictatorial two agent social choice function.
Then for all p, q ∈ Mf there are (i, tp) ∈ Df(p), (j, tq) ∈ Df (q) such that tp /∈ p(N), tq /∈ q(N).
Furthermore we can choose i, j, tp and tq in such a way that, either
(a) i 6= j,
(b) p(N) ∪ {tp} 6= q(N) ∪ {tq}, or,
(c) there is a labeling of the alternatives in A such that
p = (bca, cab), (i, cba) ∈ Df(p)
q = (cba, bca), (i, cab) ∈ Df(q)
f(p) = a.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we can find p, q ∈Mf . First of all we show that for any p ∈Mf and
(k, tp) ∈ Df(p) such that tp ∈ p(N), there is a preference t˜p /∈ p(N) such that (k, t˜p) ∈ Df (p).
This shows that we can choose (i, tp) ∈ Df(p), (j, tq) ∈ Df (q) such that tp /∈ p(N), tq /∈ q(N).
Suppose that without loss of generality k = 1. So (1, tp) ∈ Df(p) and tp ∈ p(N), hence
p = (p(1), tp). Let t˜p 6= tp be the preference such that tp = x . . . and t˜p = x . . . . Then f(t˜p, tp) =
f(tp, tp) by unanimity of f . So (1, t˜p) ∈ Df(p) as (1, tp) ∈ Df (p), t˜p /∈ p(N) = {p(1), tp}.
Note that in (a) p = q is not excluded. Suppose that (a) and (b) are not true. Then all
p, q ∈Mf are manipulable by the same agent i, without loss of generality let i = 1.
Let O2(t) := {f(p) | p(1) = t} be the set of all opportunities that agent 2 has when the
preference of agent 1 is fixed to t. Let A = {x, y, z}. Consider t = xyz in P . Then x ∈ O2(t)
by unanimity. Note that fixing agent 1′s preferences corresponds to looking at rows only in the
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tables describing f . Agent 2′s inability to manipulate implies then that we can only have a
certain type of rows.
2 : xyz xzy yxz yzx zxy zyx
1.O2(xyz) = {x} 1 : xyz x x x x x x
2.O2(xyz) = {x, y} 1 : xyz x x y y x y
3.O2(xyz) = {x, z} 1 : xyz x x x z z z
4.O2(xyz) = A 1 : xyz x x y y z z
Similar tables hold for any O2(t), t ∈ P.
Now, we fix {x, y, z} such that p(1) = xyz. Remember that p, q ∈ Mf are such that agent
1 manipulates at p and q and that
{xyz, p(2), tp} = {q(1), q(2), tq)}.
Step 0: x ∈ O2(xyz).
This is a consequence of unanimity.
Step 1: O2(xyz) 6= {x}.
If O2(xyz) = {x} then agent 1 cannot manipulate at p.
Step 2: O2(xzy) 6= {x}.
Suppose contrapositive that O2(xzy) = {x}. By step 1 there is an u ∈ O2(xyz) − {x}. Let
t1 6= t2 be the two preferences such that ti = u . . . , i = 1, 2. Then f(xyz, ti) = u, i ∈ {1, 2},
since agent 2 cannot manipulate, and so (xyz, ti) is manipulable by agent 1 towards (xzy, ti)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. But then (b) holds, contradicting our assumptions. Hence, O2(xzy) 6= {x}.
Step 3: z ∈ O2(xzy).
In view of step 2 suppose contrapositive that O2(xzy) = {x, y}. Then f(xzy, zyx) = y,
since agent 2 cannot manipulate, and f(zxy, zyx) = z by unanimity. So r = (xzy, zyx) is
manipulable by agent 1 towards (zxy, zyx) = (tr, r(2)). As p(1) = xyz /∈ r(N) ∪ {tr} this
contradicts our assumption that (b) does not hold.
Step 4: z ∈ O2(xyz).
In view of step 1 suppose contrapositive that O2(xyz) = {x, y}. Then f(xzy, zxy) = z
and f(xyz, zxy) = x, since agent 2 cannot manipulate. Hence, r = (xzy, zxy) is manipula-
ble by agent 1 towards (xyz, zxy) = (tr, r(2)). As (b) does not hold we have p(N) ∪ {tp} =
{xyz, p(2), tp} = r(N)∪{tr} = {xyz, xzy, zxy}. If p(2) ∈ {xyz, xzy} then f(p) = x by unanim-
ity. If p(2) = zxy, then f(p) = x because O2(xyz) = {x, y} and agent 2 cannot manipulate.
But f(p) = x contradicts the manipulability of p by agent 1. Hence, z ∈ O2(xyz).
Step 5: z ∈ O2(yxz) and z ∈ O2(yzx).
Suppose contrapositive that there is a t ∈ {yxz, yzx} such that z /∈ O2(t), so O2(t) ⊆ {x, y}.
Let r1 = (xyz, zxy), r2 = (xyz, zyx). By step 4 z ∈ O2(xyz), and so f(r
1) = f(r2) = z. But
then f(r1−1, t) ∈ {x, y} and f(r
2
−1, t) ∈ {x, y}, so r
1 and r2 are manipulable towards (r1−1, t)
7
and (r2−1, t) respectively. Clearly, this contradicts the assumption that (b) is not satisfied. This
proves step 5.
Step 6: O2(xzy) = {x, z}.
Suppose contrapositive that in view of step 0 and 3 O2(xzy) = A. By step 0 and 2 either
O2(xyz) = {x, z} or O2(xyz) = A. Consider first the case in which O2(xyz) = {x, z}. Let
r1 = (xzy, yxz), r2 = (xzy, yzx). Then f(r1) = f(r2) = y, whereas f(r1−1, xyz) = x and
f(r2−1, xyz) = z. Hence, r
1 and r2 are manipulable by agent 1 towards (r1−1, xyz), (r
2
−1, xyz)
respectively. But then (b) is satisfied a contradiction. So, suppose that O2(xyz) = A. We
know that p is manipulable by agent 1 and that p(1) = xyz. By steps 3 to 5, unanimity
and because agent 2 cannot manipulate f(P × {zxy, zyx}) = {z}, hence no manipulation by
agent 1 can occur if p(2) ∈ {zxy, zyx}. By unanimity agent 1 has no incentive to manipulate
if p(2) ∈ {xyz, xzy}. Hence, p(2) ∈ {yxz, yzx}. Then f(p) = y and f(tp, p(2)) = x, since agent
1 manipulates p towards (tp, p(2)). As O2(xzy) = A implies that f(xzy, p(2)) = y (agent 2
cannot manipulate), and unanimity implies that f(yxz, p(2)) = f(yzx, p(2)) = y we obtain
tp ∈ {zxy, zyx}. As f(tp, p(2)) = x the profile r = (xzy, p(2)), f(r) = y (O2(xyz) = A and
agent 2 cannot manipulate), is also manipulable by agent 1. Clearly, then with p and r (b) is
satisfied, a contradiction. Hence, O2(xzy) = {x, z}.
Step 7: y /∈ O2(zyx).
Suppose contrapositive that y ∈ O2(zyx). Then r = (zyx, yzx), f(r) = y (agent 2 cannot
manipulate), is manipulable towards (xzy, yzx) = (tr, r(2)), as f(xzy, yzx) = z by step 6 and
since agent 2 cannot manipulate. As p(1) = xyz /∈ r(N)∪ {tr} this contradicts the assumption
that (b) does not hold.
Step 8: O2(zyx) = {z}
By step 7 y /∈ O2(zyx). So suppose contrapositive that O2(zyx) = {x, z}. Then r =
(zyx, yxz), f(r) = x (agent 2 cannot manipulate), is manipulable towards (yzx, yxz) = (tr, r(2)),
as f(yzx, yxz) = y by unanimity. As p(1) = xyz /∈ r(N)∪{tr} this contradicts the assumption
that (b) does not hold.
Step 9: O2(zxy) = {z}.
Suppose contrapositive that there is an t ∈ P such that f(zxy, t) 6= z. Because of unanimity
t /∈ {zxy, zyx}. Then r = (zxy, t) is manipulable towards (zyx, t) = (tr, r(2)) by step 8.
As p(1) = xyz /∈ r(N) ∪ {tr} this contradicts the assumption that (b) does not hold unless
p(1) = t = xyz and {p(2), tp} = {zxy, zyx}. But in that case f(p−1, tp) = f(tp, p(2)) = z by
unanimity, but agent 1 in p = (xyz, p(2)) has no incentive to manipulate to a profile (p−1, tp)
where outcome z obtains. So, this contradicts the assumption that agent 1 manipulates at p
towards (p−1, tp). This finishes the proof of step 9.
Step 10: O2(yzx) = {y, z}.
In view of step 5 suppose contrapositive that O2(yzx) = A. Then r = (yzx, xzy), f(r) = x
(agent 2 cannot manipulate), is manipulable towards (zxy, xzy) = (tr, r(2)) by step 9. As
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p(1) = xyz /∈ r(N) ∪ {tr} this contradicts the assumption that (b) does not hold.
We summarize now what we know about f by steps 1 to 10 in the following 6x6 table.
2 : xyz xzy yxz yzx zxy zyx
1 : xyz x x z z
1 : xzy x x x z z z
1 : yxz y y z z
1 : yzx y z y y z z
1 : zxy z z z z z z
1 : zyx z z z z z z
We finish the proof by considering the two cases for O2(xyz) ∈ {{x, z}, A}.
If O2(xyz) = {x, z} then r = (xyz, yzx), f(r) = z, is manipulable towards (yxz, yzx) =
(tr, r(2)), and r is the only manipulable profile such that r(1) = xyz. Hence, p = r. If (b) is
not satisfied we must have q(N) ∪ {tq} = {xyz, yxz, yzx}. Since q(1) 6= xyz we have q(1) ∈
{yxz, yzx}. Since q has to be manipulable this leads to q = (yxz, xyz), tq = yzx. But then (c)
holds, letting i = 1, x = b, y = c and z = a.
On the other hand if O2(xyz) = A, then r = (xyz, yxz), f(r) = y, is manipulable towards
(xzy, yxz) = (tr, r(2)), and r is the only manipulable profile such that r(1) = xyz. Hence, p = r.
If (b) is not satisfied we must have q(N)∪{tq} = {xyz, xzy, yxz}. Since q(1) 6= xyz and clearly
also q(1) 6= xzy (otherwise q ∈ {(xzy, xyz), (xzy, yxz)} =⇒ f(q) = x) we have q(1) = yxz.
So, q ∈ {(yxz, xyz), (yxz, xzy)}. Now, if q = (yxz, xyz) then tq = xzy, so agent 1 manipulates
q towards (xzy, xyz), where he obtains the outcome x = f(xzy, xyz). This implies that x is
preferred to f(q) under the preference q(1) = yxz, hence f(q) = z. This is a contradiction, since
then agent 2 can manipulate q as well. So, only the case q = (yxz, xzy), tq = xyz, remains.
For the same reasons as in the other case the manipulability of q towards (xyz, xzy) by agent
1 implies that f(q) = z. But then (c) holds, letting i = 1, x = c, y = b, z = a, and exchanging
the roles of p and q.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Furthermore, we need the following result about the manipulability of unanimous three agent
social choice functions where coalitions are dictators. Let S ⊆ N be a nonempty coalition of
agents. We call S a dictator if for all t = xyz ∈ P and q−S ∈ P
N−S we have
f(tS, q−S) = x.
In this case we call f S−dictatorial.
Lemma 5 Let f : PN → A be a unanimous three agent social choice function. Suppose that f
is {1, 2}−dictatorial and {1, 3}−dictatorial. Then, one of the following is true.
(a) Agent 1 is a dictator.
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(b) There are anonymously inequivalent p, q ∈Mf , manipulable towards (p−i, tp), (q−j, tq), i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3}, respectively, such that |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3 and p(N) ∪ {tp} 6= q(N) ∪ {tq}.
Proof. Let f 2t : P
{1,2} → A, t ∈ P, be the two agent social choice function given by
f 2t (p) := f(p(1), p(2), t) for all p ∈ P
{1,2}. Let f 3t : P
{1,3} → A, t ∈ P, be the two agent
social choice function given by f 3t (p) := f(p(1), t, p(3)) for all p ∈ P
{1,3}.Suppose that (b) is not
true. We show that then all f 2t are dictatorial with dictator 1, so (a) holds. By unanimity and
{1, 3}−dictatoriality ({1, 2}−dictatoriality) of f we have some information about f 2t and f
3
t .
We summarize this information in the following table for t = xyz, where agent 1′s preference
is as usually described by the rows. The other agent can be either agent 2 or agent 3, and the
remaining of the three agents is fixed to the preference xyz.
2 (3) : xyz xzy yxz yzx zxy zyx
1 : xyz x x x x x x
1 : xzy x x
1 : yxz y
1 : yzx y
1 : zxy z
1 : zyx z
Let r ∈ P {1,2}. Suppose that (b) is false. For steps 1 to 4 we omit the superscript k = 2.
Step 1: The second row can be filled with x, i.e.
fxyz(xzy, t) = x for all t ∈ P.
Suppose contrapositive that u := fxyz(xzy, t) ∈ {y, z} for some t ∈ P. Let A = {u, v, w},
and p = (xzy, uvw, xyz), q = (xzy, uwv, xyz). If f(p) 6= u then p is manipulable towards
(p−2, t) = (p−2, tp), and if f(p) = u then p is manipulable towards (p−1, xyz) = (p−1, tp). The
same holds for q. Clearly, p and q are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3.
Furthermore, p(N) ∪ {tp} = q(N) ∪ {tq} implies that tp = uwv and tq = uvw. As u 6= x this
implies that agent 2 is manipulating at p and q and so tp = t = tq, contradicting tp = uwv, tq =
uvw. Hence, (b) is satisfied, a contradiction.
Step 2: fxyz is unanimous.
In view of step 1 it remains to be shown that fxyz(yxz, yzx) = fxyz(yzx, yxz) = y and
fxyz(zxy, zyx) = fxyz(zyx, zxy) = z. But for example by applying step 1 to f
3
yxz we obtain
fxyz(yzx, yxz) = f
3
yxz(yzx, xyz) = y. Likewise the other parts of unanimity of fxyz follow.
Step 3: In the third and fourth row z cannot be chosen, i.e.
fxyz(r) 6= z if r(1) ∈ {yxz, yzx}.
Suppose contrapositive that r(1) ∈ {yxz, yzx} and fxyz(r) = z. Let p = (r(1), zxy, xyz) and
q = (r(1), zyx, xyz). If f(p) 6= z then p is manipulable towards (p−2, r(2)) = (p−2, tp), and if
10
f(p) = z then p is manipulable towards (p−3, r(1)) = (p−3, tp), as by {1, 3}−dictatoriality of
f we have f(r(1), zxy, r(1)) = y. The same holds for q. Clearly, p and q are anonymously
inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3. Furthermore, p(N) ∪ {tp} = q(N) ∪ {tq} implies
that tp = zyx and tq = zxy. As r(1) ∈ {yxz, yzx} this implies that agent 2 is manipulating
at p and q and so tp = r(2) = tq, contradicting tp = zyx, tq = zxy. Hence, (b) is satisfied, a
contradiction.
Step 4: In the cell (yzx, zxy), y has to be chosen, i.e.
fxyz(yzx, zxy) = y.
Let p = (yzx, zxy, xyz) and q = (yzx, zxy, xzy). By step 3 f(p) ∈ {x, y}. Suppose contrapos-
itive to the claim of step 4 that f(p) = x. Then p is manipulable towards (p−1, zxy) = (p−1, tp)
by {1, 2}−dictatoriality of f. If f(q) 6= x then q is manipulable towards p = (q−3, xyz) =
(q−3, tq), and if f(q) = x then q is manipulable towards (q−1, zxy) by {1, 2}−dictatoriality of f.
Clearly, p and q are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3. As xzy ∈ q(N)
but xzy /∈ p(N) ∪ {tp} (b) is satisfied, a contradiction.
Step 5: In the fourth row y has to be chosen, i.e.
fxyz(yzx, t) = y for all t ∈ P.
We show step 5 for k = 2. The case k = 3 works in the same way. By step 3 we have
that f 2xyz(yzx, t) ∈ {x, y} for all t ∈ P. Furthermore, f
2
xyz(yzx, zyx) = f
3
zyx(yzx, xyz) ∈ {x, y}∩
{y, z} = {y} by step 3 applied to f 2xyz and f
3
zyx. Hence, in view of step 4, we know that
the claim is true if t ∈ {yxz, yzx, zxy, zyx}. Now, suppose contrapositive to the claim that
f 2xyz(yzx, t) = x for some t ∈ {xyz, xzy}. Let p = (yzx, zxy, xyz). Then p is manipulable
towards (p−2, t) = (p−2, tp), as f(p) = f
2
xyz(yzx, yxz) = y and f(p−2, t) = f
2
xyz(yzx, t) = x. Let
q1 = (yxz, zxy, xyz), q2 = (yzx, xzy, xyz) and q3 = (yxz, xzy, xyz). By step 3 f(qi) ∈ {x, y}
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We show that for all possible combinations of f(qi) ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
(b) is satisfied, contradicting our assumptions.
If f(q1) = x then q1 is manipulable towards (q1−1, yzx) = (q
1
−1, tq1) = (yzx, zxy, xyz), as
f(yzx, zxy, xyz) = y. Clearly, p and q1 are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| =
|q1(N)| = 3. As q1(1) = yxz /∈ p(N) ∪ {tp} ⊂ {yzx, zxy, xyz, xzy}, (b) is satisfied. Hence, we
are done unless f(q1) = y.
If f(q2) = y then q2 is manipulable towards (q2−2, t) = (q
2
−2, tq2) = (yzx, t, xyz), as f(yzx, t, xyz) =
x. Clearly, p and q2 are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| = |q2(N)| = 3. As
p(2) = zxy /∈ q2(N) ∪ {tq2} ⊂ {yzx, xzy, xyz}, (b) is satisfied, a contradiction. Hence, we
are done unless f(q2) = x.
If f(q3) = y then q2 is manipulable towards (q2−1, yxz) = (q
2
−1, tq2) = q
3, as f(q2) = x. Still,
p and q2 are anonymously inequivalent, satisfy |p(N)| = |q2(N)| = 3, and p(2) = zxy /∈ q2(N)∪
{tq2} ⊂ {yzx, xzy, xyz, yxz}, so (b) is satisfied. Hence, f(q
3) = x. But then q1 is manipulable
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towards (q1−2, xzy) = (q
1
−2, tq1) = q
3, as f(q1) = y. Still, p and q1 are anonymously inequivalent,
satisfy |p(N)| = |q2(N)| = 3, and q1(1) = yxz /∈ p(N) ∪ {tp} ⊂ {yzx, zxy, xyz, xzy}, so (b) is
satisfied. This finishes the proof of step 4.
Step 6: In the third row y has to be chosen, i.e.
fxyz(yxz, t) = y for all t ∈ P.
We show step 5 for k = 2. The case k = 3 works in the same way. By step 3 we have
that f 2xyz(yxz, t) ∈ {x, y} for all t ∈ P. Furthermore, f
2
xyz(yxz, zyx) = f
3
zyx(yxz, xyz) ∈ {x, y}∩
{y, z} = {y} by step 3 applied to f 2xyz and f
3
zyx. Hence, we know that the claim is true if
t ∈ {yxz, yzx, zyx}.We extend this to {xzy, yxz, yzx, zxy, zyx}. So suppose contrapositive that
t ∈ {xzy, zxy} and f 2xyz(yxz, t) = x. Then p = (yxz, t, xyz) is manipulable by agent 1 towards
(yzx, t, xyz) = (tp, t, xyz). As t ∈ {xzy, zxy}, |p(N)| = 3. Consider t˜ ∈ {xzy, zxy} − {t} and
let q = (yxz, t˜, xyz). If f(q) = x then q is manipulable by agent 1 towards (yzx, t˜, xyz) =
(tq, t˜, xyz). If f(q) = y then q is manipulable by agent 2 towards (yxz, t, xyz) = (yxz, tq, xyz).
In both cases |q(N)| = 3 as t˜ ∈ {xzy, zxy}. Furthermore, p(N) ∪ {tp} 6= q(N) ∪ {tq}, as
t˜ ∈ q(N) but t˜ /∈ p(N) ∪ {tp} = {yxz, yzx, t, xyz}. Hence, (b) is satisfied, a contradiction. So,
fxyz(yxz, t) = y for all t ∈ P −{xyz}. It remains to be shown that fxyz(yxz, xyz) = y. Suppose
contrapositive that fxyz(yxz, xyz) = x. Then p = (yxz, xzy, xyz) and q = (yxz, zxy, xyz),
f(p) = f(q) = y, are both manipulable by agent 2 towards (yxz, xyz, xyz). So (b) is satisfied,
a contradiction. This proves step 6.
Step 7: f 2xyz can be described by the following 6x6 table.
2 : xyz xzy yxz yzx zxy zyx
1 : xyz x x x x x x
1 : xzy x x x x x x
1 : yxz y y y y y y
1 : yzx y y y y y y
1 : zxy z z z z
1 : zyx z z z z
The first four rows and the {zxy, zyx}{1,2}−cells follow by steps 1,5 and 6 applied to f 2xyz. By
steps 5 and 6 applied to f 3yzx we see that f
2
xyz(t, yzx) = f
3
yzx(t, xyz) = z for all t ∈ {zxy, zyx}.
Likewise, f 2xyz(t, xzy) = z for all t ∈ {zxy, zyx} by applying steps 5 and 6 to f
3
xzy.
We prove now that f is dictatorial with dictator 1. This is equivalent to dictatoriality of
all f 2t , t ∈ P. To the contrary suppose that for some t ∈ P f
2
t is nondictatorial. Without
loss of generality t ∈ {xyz, yxz}. Note that for both of these t the table of f 2t is similar.
In view of step 7 this implies that there is a r ∈ V := {zxy, zyx} × {xyz, yxz}, such that
u = f 2t (r) ∈ {x, y}. Without loss of generality r(1) = zxy, otherwise exchange the roles of x
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and y which is allowed as we only fixed t ∈ {xyz, yxz}. Let A = {u, v, z}, p = (r(1), uzv, t).
Then p is manipulable towards (p−2, r(2)) = (p−2, tp) = (r, t), as f
2
t (r) = u and f(p) = z. If
there is an r˜ ∈ {zyx}×{xyz, yxz} such that u˜ = f 2t (r˜) ∈ {x, y}, A = {u˜, z, v˜} then, likewise, one
obtains that q = (r˜(1), u˜zv˜, t)) is manipulable towards (q−2, r˜(2)) = (q−2, tq) = (r˜, t). Clearly,
such p, q, tp and tq satisfy (b), a contradiction. Hence, we are done unless
f 2t (zyx, t˜) = z for all t˜ ∈ P.
Let q = (zxy, yxz, t). If f(q) = z then q is manipulable towards (q−2, r(2)) = (q−2, tq) = (r, t), as
f(r, t) ∈ {x, y}. Clearly, p and q are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3.
As p(2) = uzv /∈ q(N) ∪ {tq} ⊂ {zxy, yxz, xyz} (b) is satisfied, a contradiction. Hence, we
are done unless f(q) ∈ {x, y}. But then q is manipulable towards (q−1, zyx) = (q−1, tq), as
f(zyx, q) = f 2t (zyx, q(2)) = z. Still, p and q are anonymously inequivalent, satisfy |p(N)| =
|q(N)| = 3, and p(2) = uzv /∈ q(N) ∪ {tq} ⊂ {zxy, yxz, xyz, zyx}. Hence, (b) is satisfied, and
we have obtained contradictions in all cases. So, there is no nondictatorial ft and this finishes
the proof.
4 The lower bound 2n − 2
In this section we will prove minf∈F |Mf | ≥ 2
n − 2, using the results from Section 3.
Let k : PN → {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , n} be given by
k(p) := min{|p−1(T )| | T ⊆ P, |p
−1(T )| ≥
n
2
}
and l : PN → {0, . . . ,
⌈
n
2
⌉
} by l(p) := n − k(p). Then the following lemma holds for profiles
that contain at least three different preferences.
Lemma 6 Let p be a profile such that |p(N)| ≥ 3. Then
|[p]| ≥
l(p)−1∑
j=0
(
n
k(p) + j
)
.
Proof. Let T be such that |p−1(T )| = k(p). Then
|[p]| =
n!∏
t∈P |p
−1(t)|
=
n!∏
t∈T |p
−1(t)|!
∏
t∈P−T |p
−1(t)|!
≥
n!
(k(p)− |T |+ 1)!(l(p)− |P |+ |T |+ 1)!
=
k(p)!
(k(p)− |T |+ 1)!
l(p)!
(l(p)− |P |+ |T |+ 1)!
(
n
k(p)
)
≥ l(p)
(
n
k(p)
)
≥
l(p)−1∑
j=0
(
n
k(p) + j
)
,
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The first inequality holds as ∏
t∈T˜
|p−1(t)|! ≤ (k(p)− |T˜ |+ 1)!
for all T˜ ⊆ P by applying Lemma 2 repeatedly. Furthermore, by |p(N)| ≥ 3 either |P −T | ≥ 2
and
l(p)!
(l(p)− |P |+ |T |+ 1)!
≥
l(p)!
(l(p)− 1)!
= l(p)
or |T | ≥ 2 and
k(p)!
(k(p)− |T |+ 1)!
≥
k(p)!
(k(p)− 1)!
= k(p) ≥ l(p),
which justifies the second inequality. Finally the third inequality is valid as(
n
k(p)
)
≥
(
n
k(p) + j
)
for all j ∈ {0, . . . , l(p)− 1}, since k(p) ≥ n
2
.
Let M3f := {p ∈Mf | |p(N)| ≥ 3}, and if M
3
f 6= ∅ let
p1 ∈ arg min
p∈M3
f
k(p), k1 := k(p1), l1 := l(p1),
and if M3f = ∅ let k1 = k2 = n. Furthermore, if k1 < n and M
3
f − [p1] 6= ∅ let
p2 ∈ arg min
p∈M3
f
−[p1]
k(p), k2 := k(p2), l2 := l(p2),
and if M3f − [p1] = ∅ let k2 = n.
The next lemma shows, using the results from Section 3, that for all k ∈ {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , k1−1} we
have two profiles qk1 , q
k
2 ∈Mf such that |q
k
1(N)| = |q
k
2(N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1 ) = k(q
k
2 ) = k. If k 6=
n
2
we show that these two profiles are anonymously inequivalent. For all k ∈ {k1, . . . , k2 − 1}
we show that there is one profile qk1 ∈ Mf such that |q
k
1(N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1) = k. Now note
that profiles p, q ∈ PN , such that |p(N)| = |q(N)| = 2 and k(p) 6= k(q) are anonymously
inequivalent. Altogether, this then shows that, if n is odd,
|Mf | ≥ |
k2−1⋃
k=⌈n
2
⌉
[qk1 ] ∪
k1−1⋃
k=⌈n
2
⌉
[qk2 ] ∪ [p1] ∪ [p2]|
=
k2−1∑
k=⌈n
2
⌉
(
n
k
)
+
k1−1∑
k=⌈n
2
⌉
(
n
k
)
+ |[p1]|+ |[p2]|
≥
k2−1∑
k=⌈n
2
⌉
(
n
k
)
+
k1−1∑
k=⌈n
2
⌉
(
n
k
)
+
l1−1∑
j=0
(
n
k1 + j
)
+
l2−1∑
j=0
(
n
k2 + j
)
=
n−1∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 2,
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where we use Lemma 6 for the second inequality. Likewise one shows that |Mf | ≥ 2
n − 2 if
n is even, the only difference is that the two profiles q
n
2
1 , q
n
2
2 do not have to be anonymously
inequivalent.
Lemma 7 Let f : PN → A be a unanimous and anonymous social choice function. Let
k1, k2, p1, p2 be as defined above. Then for all k ∈ {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , k1 − 1} there are two profiles
qk1 , q
k
2 ∈Mf such that |q
k
1(N)| = |q
k
2(N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1 ) = k(q
k
2) = k. If k 6=
n
2
these two profiles
are anonymously inequivalent. For all k ∈ {k1, . . . , k2 − 1} there is a profile q
k
1 ∈Mf such that
|qk1(N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1 ) = k.
Proof. We will apply Lemma 4 to the following two agent social choice functions to show
the existence of the qki .
Let k ∈ K := {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , n}, and l := n− k. Define fk : P
{1,2} → A by
fk(p) := f(p(1)
k, p(2)l)
for all p ∈ P {1,2}, where (p(1)k, p(2)l) denotes a profile q in PN , such that |q−1(p(1))| = k and
|q−1(p(2))| = l. As f is anonymous fk is well defined and as f is unanimous, fk is unanimous.
To apply Lemma 4 to a fk, k ≤ k2, we have to show that fk is nondictatorial. Let d be the
smallest k ∈ K such that fk is dictatorial,
d := min{k ∈ K | fk is dictatorial}.
Note that fn is dictatorial with dictator 1, so d ≤ n. We show that k2 ≤ d, which implies that
all fk, k ≤ k2, are nondictatorial.
Claim 1:
k2 ≤ d.
If d = n this is trivial. Suppose that d < n. Let l := n − d. As f is anonymous d > n
2
≥ l.
Consider the following three agent social choice function. Let g : P {1,2,3} → A be given
by g(p) := f(p(1)d−l, p(2)l, p(3)l), where (p(1)d−l, p(2)l, p(3)l) can be understood similarly to
(p(1)k, p(2)l) above. As f is anonymous g is well defined and as f is unanimous, g is unanimous.
Furthermore, as fd is dictatorial, g is {1, 2} and {1, 3}−dictatorial. So we can apply Lemma 5
to g.
If part (a) of Lemma 5 holds, i.e. if agent 1 is a dictator, then f
d˜
, where d˜ := max{2l, d−l} ∈
K, is dictatorial. If d˜ < d then, as d˜ ≥ n
2
, this contradicts the minimality of d. So, d˜ ≥ d, which
implies that 2l ≥ d. If 2l = d then g is anonymous, contradicting dictatoriality. So, l > d− l.
Consider the profiles
ri := (abcd−l+i, bcal−i, cabl), i ∈ {0, . . . , 2l − d}.
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Then, f(r0) = a, f(r2l−d) = b, as f is anonymous and g is dictatorial with dictator 1. But
any ri+1 is a j-deviation of ri for an agent j such that (b, a) ∈ ri(j). Hence, one of the ri is
manipulable. Clearly, ri ∈M3f and k(r
i) ≤ d for this ri. For the same reasons a rj ,
rj := (acbd−l+j, bcal−j , cabl), j ∈ {0, . . . , 2l − d},
is manipulable, in M3f , and k(r
j) ≤ d for this rj . As this rj is anonymously inequivalent to ri
we have k2 ≤ max{k(r
i), k(rj)} ≤ d.
So, suppose that part (b) of Lemma 5 is true. Then we have anonymously inequivalent p, q ∈
Mg, manipulable towards (p−i, tp), (q−j, tq), i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, respectively, such that |p(N)| =
|q(N)| = 3 and p(N) ∪ {tp} 6= q(N) ∪ {tq}. If i ∈ {2, 3} then by anonymity of f i = 2 without
loss of generality. The same holds for j. Let
rs :=
{
(p(1)d−l−s, tsp, p(2)
l, p(3)l) if i = 1, s ∈ {0, . . . , d− l − 1},
(p(1)d−l, p(2)l−s, tsp, p(3)
l) if i = 2, s ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1},
and
ru :=
{
(q(1)d−l−s, tsq, q(2)
l, q(3)l) if j = 1, u ∈ {0, . . . , d− l − 1},
(q(1)d−l, q(2)l−s, tsq, q(3)
l) if j = 2, u ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}.
By manipulability of p and q under g there are such rs and ru that are manipulable under f. As
|p(N)| = |q(N)| = 3, rs, ru ∈M3f . As p and q are anonymously inequivalent and p(N) ∪ {tp} 6=
q(N)∪{tq} we have [r
s] ≁ [ru]. So, k2 ≤ max{k(r
s), k(ru)} ≤ d. This finishes the proof of claim
1.
Let k ∈ {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , k2 − 1}. By claim 1 fk is nondictatorial. So, by Theorem 3 there are
p, q ∈Mfk . Note that we do not demand p 6= q here, because we want to allow for the moment
for the possibility that p and q fall under case (a) of Lemma 4. However, if necessary we can
always choose p and q to satisfy p 6= q by the same theorem. By the first part of Lemma 4
there are (i, tp) ∈ Dfk(p), (j, tq) ∈ Dfk(q) such that tp /∈ p(N), tq /∈ q(N). Let
rs :=
{
(p(1)k−s, p(2)l, tsp) if i = 1, s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
(p(1)k, p(2)l−s, tsp) if i = 2, s ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1},
and
ru :=
{
(q(1)k−u, q(2)l, tuq ) if i = 1, u ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
(q(1)k, q(2)l−u, tuq ) if i = 2, u ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}.
By manipulability of p and q under fk there are s and u such that r
s, ru ∈ Mf that are
manipulable towards rs+1 or ru+1 respectively. Let s be the smallest index s such that an rs is
manipulable, i.e. the manipulation does not have to occur towards rs+1. Let u be the smallest
index u such that ru is manipulable towards ru+1. The reason for these choices will become
apparent in case (c).
16
Suppose that
k ∈ {
⌈n
2
⌉
, . . . , k1 − 1}.
As k(rs) ≤ k < k1, k(r
u) ≤ k < k1, |r
s(N)| ≥ 3 if s ≥ 1 and |ru(N)| ≥ 3 if u ≥ 1, we must
have s = 0 and u = 0. So qk1 := (p(1)
k, p(2)l) = r0 ∈ Mf and q
k
2 := (q(1)
k, q(2)l) = r0 ∈ Mf
satisfy qk1 , q
k
2 ∈ Mf , |q
k
1(N)| = |q
k
2(N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1) = k(q
k
2 ) = k. If k =
n
2
we are done. If
k 6= n
2
then k > l and choosing p 6= q implies that qk1 and q
k
2 are anonymously inequivalent. So,
for k ∈ {
⌈
n
2
⌉
, . . . , k1 − 1} we are done.
Suppose that
k ∈ {k1, . . . , k2 − 1}.
We are done if s = 0 or u = 0. So, suppose contrapositive that s > 0 and u > 0. Using cases
(a) to (c) of Lemma 4 we show that p and q can be chosen in such a way that rs ≁ ru. As
k(rs) ≤ k, k(ru) ≤ k, |rs(N)| ≥ 3 and |ru(N)| ≥ 3 if u ≥ 1, this contradicts k < k2.
Case (a): We can choose p and q inMfk that are manipulable by different agents, say without
loss of generality p by agent 1 and q by agent 2. Note that here we have to allow for p = q.
Then
max
t∈P
|(rs)−1(t)| = max{k − s, l, s} ≤ k − 1 < k = (ru)−1(q(1)),
so rs ≁ ru.
Case (b): We can choose p and q in Mfk such that p(N)∪{tp} 6= q(N)∪{tq}. Then r
s
≁ ru
is obvious.
Case (c): Either i = j = 1 and
p = (bca, cab), (1, cba) ∈ Dfk(p)
q = (cba, bca), (1, cab) ∈ Dfk(q)
fk(p) = a
or i = j = 2 and
p = (cab, bca), (2, cba) ∈ Dfk(p)
q = (bca, cba), (2, cab) ∈ Dfk(q)
fk(p) = a.
Suppose that i = j = 1 and rs ∼ ru. Then
rs = (bcak−s, cbas, cabl) ∼ (cbak−u, cabu, bcal) = ru.
This implies that k − s = l, s = k − u and l = u. Note that f(r0) = fk(p) = a is the least
preferred alternative of the manipulating agent, who has the preference bca. By the minimality
of s and the anonymity of f this implies that f(r0) = f(r1) = . . . f(rs−1) = f(rs) = f(ru) = a.
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Furthermore, as (cbak−u, cabu, bcal) is manipulable by an agent with preference cba, we have
f(cbak−u−1, cabu+1, bcal) ∈ {b, c}. Hence,
f(cbak−u−1, cabu+1, bcal) = f(cbas−1, cabl+1, bcak−s) ∈ {b, c}.
But then rs−1 is manipulable, as f(rs−1) = f(bcak−s+1, cbas−1, cabl) = a, and by deviating to
cab any agent with preference bca can manipulate. This contradicts the minimality of s.
Suppose that i = j = 2 and rs ∼ ru. Then
rs = (bcak, cabl−s, cbas) ∼ (cbak, bcal−u, cabu) = ru.
This implies by k > l that bca = cba, a contradiction.
Hence, in any of the cases (a) to (c) p and q can be chosen in such a way that rs ≁ ru. This
contradicts then k < k2 if s > 0 and u > 0. So, without loss of generality u = 0, and letting
qk1 = r
0 ∈ Mf we have |q
k
1 (N)| = 2 and k(q
k
1) = k.
This finishes the proof of the lemma.
By the remarks before Lemma 7 we can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 8 Let f : PN → A be a unanimous and anonymous social choice function. Then
|Mf | ≥ 2
n − 2.
5 Social choice functions f∗ that attain the lower bound
2n − 2
Let F ∗ := {f ∈ F | |Mf | = 2
n − 2} be the set of all social choice functions attaining the
lower bound. In this section we formulate a conjecture about F ∗, saying that f ∗ ∈ F ∗, n ≥ 4,
if and only if f ∗ belongs to one of three classes of social choice functions which we describe
completely. There will be an exception for n ∈ {2, 3}. First of all one class is only defined for
n ≥ 3, where its definition in the case n = 3 compared to n ≥ 4 alters a litte. Furthermore, for
n = 3 a fourth extra class of social choice functions is needed. Altogether we define four classes
Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, of social choice functions such that Ci ⊆ F
∗. For any x ∈ A and p ∈ PN let
Pa(x, p) := {y ∈ A− {x} | (y, x) ∈ p(i) for all i ∈ N}
be the set of all alternatives that Pareto dominate x in p. In 1. up to 5. it is to be understood
that indefiniteness is resolved in such a way that anonymity and unanimity hold. Let A =
{x, y, z}.
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1. Let C1 ⊆ F be the set of all social choice functions f such that
f(p) =

z if Pa(z, p) = ∅
x if Pa(z, p) = {x}
y if Pa(z, p) = {y}
and f(p) = f(q) ∈ {x, y, z} for all q ∈ PN such that
Pa(z, p) = Pa(z, q) = {x, y}, [q] = [p].
2. Let C2 ⊆ F be the set of all social choice functions f such that
f(p) =

z if Pa(z, p) = ∅
x if Pa(z, p) = {x}
y if Pa(z, p) = {y} and p /∈ [(xyzn−1, yzx)]
z if p ∈ [(xyzn−1, yzx)]
x if p ∈ [(xyzn−1, yxz)]
and f(p) = f(q) ∈ {x, y, z} for all p, q ∈ PN such that Pa(z, p) = Pa(z, q) = {x, y}, [p] =
[q] 6= [(xyzn−1, yxz)].
3. If n ≥ 4 let C3 ⊆ F be the set of all social choice functions f such that
f(p) =

z if Pa(z, p) = ∅
x if Pa(z, p) = {x} and p /∈ [(yxzn−1, xzy)]
y if Pa(z, p) = {y} and p /∈ [(xyzn−1, yzx)]
z if p ∈ [(yxzn−1, xzy)]
z if p ∈ [(xyzn−1, yzx)]
x if p ∈ [(xyzn−1, yxz)] ∪ [(xyzn−2, yxz2)]
y if p ∈ [(yxzn−1, xyz)] ∪ [(yxzn−2, xyz2)]
and f([p]) ∈ {x, y, z} if Pa(z, p) = {x, y} and p /∈ [(xyzn−1, yxz)] ∪ [(xyzn−2, yxz2)] ∪
[(yxzn−1, xyz)] ∪ [(yxzn−2, xyz2)].
4. If n = 3 let C3 ⊆ F be the set of all social choice functions f such that
f(p) =

z if Pa(z, p) = ∅
x if Pa(z, p) = {x} and p /∈ [(yxz2, xzy)]
y if Pa(z, p) = {y} and p /∈ [(xyz2, yzx)]
z if p ∈ [(yxz2, xzy)]
z if p ∈ [(xyz2, yzx)]
x if p ∈ [(xyz2, yxz)]
y if p ∈ [(yxz2, xyz)]
and f(p) ∈ {x, y, z} if Pa(z, p) = {x, y} and p /∈ [(xyz2, yxz)] ∪ [(yxz2, xyz)].
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5. If n = 3 let C4 ⊆ F be the set of all social choice functions f for which there are
x, y ∈ A, x 6= y, such that f(p) is determined by majority voting between x and y, i.e.
f(p) =
{
x if |{i ∈ N | (x, y) ∈ p(i)}| > |{i ∈ N | (y, x) ∈ p(i)}|,
y if |{i ∈ N | (y, x) ∈ p(i)}| > |{i ∈ N | (x, y) ∈ p(i)}|,
for all profiles p where f(p) is not determined already by unanimity.
The following lemma can be proven by counting manipulable profiles and evaluating the
freedom left in the definitions of the Ci. The counting argument can be simplified by noting
that no agent will want to manipulate to a Pareto dominated alternative. Since the rest is
elementary counting we do not present the proof here.
Lemma 9 Let F ∗ be the set of all minimally manipulable unanimous and anonymous social
choice function with n agents and three alternatives. Then, C1 ∪ C2 ⊆ F
∗ if n = 2, C1 ∪ C2 ∪
C3 ∪C4 ⊆ F
∗ if n = 3 and C1 ∪C2 ∪C3 ⊆ F
∗ if n ≥ 4. Furthermore, the Ci that are defined in
a particular case are disjoint. We have |C1| = 3
n, |C2| = 2 ∗ 3
n−1, and |C3| = 3
n−2, |C4| = 3, if
they are defined, and
|F ∗| ≥

15 if n = 2,
51 if n = 3,
3n + 2 ∗ 3n−1 + 3n−2 if n ≥ 4.
We conjecture that equalities hold in the lemma. We believe that the proof of the main
result in Section 4 can be used to show this conjecture and explain how this might be done.
First of all we note that in the statement of Lemma 6
[pi] ≥
l(pi)−1∑
j=0
(
n
k(pi) + j
)
, pi ∈M
3
f ,
equality cannot hold. Going through the proof of that statement one can see that equality
would imply that l(pi) = 1, k(pi) = n − 1, and |pi(N)| = 2, a contradiction. So, M
3
f∗ = ∅
for any f ∗ ∈ F ∗. This also implies that d = n. Hence, all manipulable profiles arise from the
fk. In particular for each fk we must have that it yields only two anonymously inequivalent
manipulable profiles. Now, classifying all such fk, we know the possible Mf
′s and what f can
look like on {p ∈ PN | |p(N)| ≤ 2}. Connecting this information by strategy-proofness, in
particular on B3 := {p ∈ PN | |p(N)| ≥ 3}, it might be possible to characterize F ∗. The reason
why we do not pursue this here is the classification of all such fk. There are 125 unanimous
and nondictatorial two agent social choice functions with two manipulable profiles which have
to be checked first, and there might be even more with more manipulable profiles, but only two
that give anonymously inequivalent profiles for f .
We mention also that we have confirmed the following conjecture up to 8 agents by computer,
which is also how we found the 125 unanimous and nondictatorial two agent social choice
functions over three alternatives.
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Conjecture 10 Let F ∗ be the set of all minimally manipulable unanimous and anonymous
social choice functions for a fixed size of the agent set n. Then
F ∗ =

C1 ∪ C2 if n = 2,
C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4 if n = 3,
C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 if n ≥ 4,
where the Ci are defined as in Lemma 9. Furthermore, as the Ci are disjoint,
|F ∗| =

9 + 6 = 15 if n = 2,
27 + 18 + 3 + 3 = 51 if n = 3,
3n + 2 ∗ 3n−1 + 3n−2 if n ≥ 4.
6 Pareto optimality and anonymity
In this section we show how our results and the conjecture apply when unanimity is replaced
by the stronger requirement of Pareto optimality.
A social choice function is called Pareto optimal if it does not choose Pareto dominated
alternatives, i.e. if Pa(x, p) 6= ∅, x ∈ A, implies that f(p) 6= x. Pareto optimality is a stronger
requirement than unanimity. Let p be such that f(p) = x is determined by unanimity. Then
Pa(y, p) ⊇ {x} for all y ∈ A − {x}, implying that f(p) 6= y for all y ∈ A − {x}. So f(p) = x
also by Pareto optimality. On the other hand f(abc, bca) ∈ {a, b} by Pareto optimality, but
unanimity does not reduce the choice at this profile. Let G be the set of Pareto optimal and
anonymous social choice functions. Then G ⊂ F.
Let C1 ⊆ G be the set of all social choice functions g ∈ G for which there is a labeling of
the alternatives A = {x, y, z} such that
g(p) =

z if Pa(z, p) = ∅
x if Pa(z, p) = {x}
y if Pa(z, p) = {y}
and g(p) = g(q) ∈ {x, y} for all q ∈ PN such that
Pa(z, p) = Pa(z, q) = {x, y}, [q] = [p].
Note that C1 ⊂ G ⊂ F and C1 ⊂ C1 ⊂ F
∗ So the following lemma is implied by Lemma 9
and counting C1.
Lemma 11 Let G∗ be the set of minimally manipulable social choice functions in G. Then
C1 ⊆ G
∗, |C1| = 3 ∗ 2
n and |G∗| ≥ 3 ∗ 2n.
Furthermore, G ⊆ F implies then the following corollary to Theorem 8.
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Corollary 12 Let g : PN → A be a Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice function.
Then |Mg| ≥ 2
n − 2.
It is easily checked that there are no Pareto optimal social choice functions in Ci, i ∈ {2, 3, 4},
whenever these sets are defined. So we can state the following conjecture based on conjecture
10.
Conjecture 13 Let G∗ be the set of all minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous
social choice functions for a fixed size of the agent set n. Then
G∗ = C1,
and
|G∗| = 3 ∗ 2n.
Note that for any g ∈ C1 there is an alternative z that is chosen whenever it is not Pareto
dominated by one of the other alternatives. We call this alternative the status quo. If z is
Pareto dominated, then the choice is taken among one of the dominating alternatives in an
arbitrary way. In practice this arbitrariness might be replaced by a voting rule between x and
y that seems reasonable in the given situation. For example it might be that y is declared as a
second status quo, so that x is only chosen if p = x . . .n.
Anyway these explanations show that our result has a nice interpretation if a status quo
z among the alternatives exists, e.g. a current jurisdiction z about which there is consensus
that it should only be altered to one of two new jurisdictions x and y if every voter prefers the
new jurisdiction. Then, the least manipulable social choice functions that guarantee anonymity
and Pareto optimality of the outcome are as follows. Choose z in the situation where there is
consensus that no change should be made. In the other situations choose an alternative Pareto
dominating z; if necessary, i.e. if there are two such alternatives, according to any unanimous
social choice function over two alternatives.
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